The Quintessential Outsider

In his book The Argumentative Indian, Amartya Sen talks of a concept which he calls ‘friendly fire’, where a policy initially meant to benefit a certain disadvantaged section of society actually ends up working against the benefit of that very section. This happens mainly because the implementation of such a policy results in the creation of a new privileged section out of the originally disadvantaged one, and this new group not only corners all (or most of) the benefits of the original policy, but also uses the plight of the disadvantaged as an excuse to maintain a status quo with respect to the concerned policy.

Sen discusses this concept in two contexts in India – one being the problem of endemic hunger and undernourishment, and the food policy of the government, especially the policy of high minimum support prices for food grains, and the second being the role of teachers’ unions in West Bengal in defending errant and undisciplined teachers from punitive action, especially in rural government-run primary schools where a large majority of the students are from families at the bottom of the economic and social spectrum.

Sen’s arguments in these two contexts can be read in The Argumentative Indian. However, his concept of ‘friendly fire’ can be applied to another topic, which has, in the last few months, stirred up the proverbial ‘hornet’s nest’ – the issue of reservations in educational institutions. In fact, in my opinion, the issue of reservations, or to be more precise, the effect of reservations on the classes it is meant for, can be offered as the classic example of ‘friendly fire’ at work.

The standard debate on reservations almost always seems to be between two camps, predictably called ‘pro-reservation’ and ‘anti-reservation’. The arguments offered by both these ‘camps’ are equally predictable, and I won’t go into them. The important thing to note, however, is that the members of the ‘pro-reservation camp’ are either well-meaning (but not as well-informed) individuals (with the proverbial ‘bleeding hearts’), or they belong to a section of the ‘backward classes’ euphemistically called the ‘creamy layer’.

This ‘creamy layer’ consists of economically and/or politically powerful groups who originally belonged (and legally still do) to the ‘backward classes’, but who have, through generations of enjoying reservations, acquired a status equal to that of any other ‘privileged’ group. In fact, in the ‘fragmented democracy’ that India is today, these groups usually hold sway over the opinions of electorally precious ‘vote-banks’, thus becoming politically much more powerful than they are generally assumed to be.

On the other side of the debate are the ‘anti-reservationists’, who are typically even less-informed, and whose stance is typically a knee-jerk reaction to a proposed move for bringing in (or increasing) reservations in a particular sector. Both these ‘camps’ tend to rely more on anecdotes and examples from personal experience for their arguments. The anecdotes are also very similar, of intelligent, hard-working students ‘who could not achieve what they deserved’ because of the presence/absence (depending on one’s stance) of reservations.

The problem with these arguments is that they seek to extend conclusions drawn from ‘micro level’ experiences to a policy which has significant effects at the ‘macro level’. On the other hand, it does not help to make broad generalizations either, (depending, again, on which side of the debate one is on) like ‘all lower-class people are dumb’ (or undeserving, to put it mildly), ‘all upper-class people have reached where they are through exploitation of the lower classes’, and so on.

If the ‘argumentative Indians’ involved in these debates were only ill-informed, they could be excused for that. However, things are not so simple. Over the years, the issue of reservations has become a pet pooch of politicians looking to garner ‘backward class’ votes. It is quite obvious to everyone that the actual beneficiaries of these reservations are just a ‘privileged’ fraction of the ‘backward classes’, and in fact, in some cases, are directly related to the lobbying politicians themselves. Yet, the ‘intended beneficiaries’ continue to be swayed by these measures and continue to believe that it is all for their own good.

The fault isn’t entirely theirs, though. The choice before the Indian electorate is essentially like choosing between the devil and the deep sea, so if on one hand, we have politicians who can be accused of playing the ‘reservation card’ for their own ulterior motives, on the other hand, there are those who can be accused of (almost criminal) neglect of the problem of social inequality, of pretending that the problem just didn’t exist, or believing that a certain Constitutional provision made sixty years ago was enough to deal with it.

However, it will not be right to stop at blaming certain people (politicians and others) for ‘consciously’ creating the problem. There are certain ‘backward’ castes/classes in some parts of India who have had better access to primary education, etc., and consequently, are better placed to make use of reservations to gain access to higher education and better employment. It is not their fault that they received better primary facilities, nor can they be expected, if they are to act according to economic rationality, to consciously give away, or not to use, benefits which are legally provided to them. Individuals may be altruistic, communities are mostly not. On the contrary, it is quite obvious that they will consciously lobby to preserve these benefits for themselves. And in so doing, such groups end up being guilty of ‘friendly fire’ against their ‘less privileged’ brethren. It might be fair to say that the ‘creamy layer’ should be excluded from reservations, but one cannot expect the ‘creamy layer’ to exclude itself from the privilege; they will have to ‘be excluded’ by someone in authority who cares to look at the problem objectively.

Thus, the key here is that the actual decision-makers should not bow to pressure from lobbies, but how can that be achieved? It is a well-known problem of democracy that the average individual voter has little incentive to spend time and effort on deciding how best to use his/her vote, because the benefits of that extra effort will be spread over a large number of people. The problem is not just lack of information, but also the lack of incentive for the voters to acquire and use the available information. On the other hand, a small group which might benefit much more from a particular candidate being elected than any other has every incentive to manipulate the process in their favour. This renders the democratic process prone to ‘lobbying’ and manipulation by ‘vested interests’, and this problem is a universal one, and not restricted to India alone.

So, what is the solution? One solution seems to be more information, and a more proactive electorate which cares to use that information and its vote in the best possible manner, with or without any immediate incentive for itself. Some degree of altruism is required, and if it comes from the electors, it can be assumed that it will also be found in the elected, who will then, hopefully, deal with the concerned problems objectively, without bowing to ‘vested interests’ or powerful ‘lobbies’.

The problem of ‘friendly fire’, whether it is in the context of reservations or anywhere else, is actually a major reason why ‘good intentions’ alone do not work (if at all they truly exist in the first place). Good intentions have to be coupled with proper information, and the sense to use both. Altruism has to join hands with pragmatism, if we are to arrive at any lasting solution. 

(Note: I wrote this article for some other purpose, so the tone is a bit more formal. The promised posts on Lage Raho Munnabhai and The Da Vinci Code will come soon)